• civil servants are underpaid and may not be willing to undertake an additional activity of preparing a defence in the Tribunal
• civil servants work 8h per day and may find it difficult to spare some time in order to prepare a defence
• a litigation may appear intimidating for the authors of a bill, especially when it is a controversial or publicly disputed proposal

• set a successful defence treshod as a prerequisite in the career path of civil servants by amending the Civil Service Act (Dz.U. of 2008 vol. 227 item 1505)
• civil servants could be paid for a defence of their bills in the litigation in analogy to the reimbursement which lawyers receive in a litigation
• perhaps it should be a responsibility of legal departments of respective institutions to defend bills crafted within those institutions

• set a quality threshold, i.e. litigation could be open only for NGOs and academia or
• set a quantity threshold, i.e. a prerequisite to form a pool of 10 claimants (similarly to the Class Action Act, Dz.U. of 2010 vol. 7 item 44)
• set a substantive threshold

• BIP of respective institutions responsible for producing the bill under litigation
• website of the Tribunal
• a new periodical established to serve only the Tribunal
• an existing periodical

• the quality of translations
• the quality of implementation

• citizens and organizations have standing to challenge laws at the Tribunal;
• the challenge is that the law represents deficient quality;
• deficient quality means that the law is unclear, outdated, dead, unenforceable, overly bureaucratic, unnecessarily complicated, based on inaccurate or outdated evidence, or that it practically contravenes other laws, excessively interferes with free markets, produces inherently incoherent case law, or it is predictably unstable (requiring frequent amendments) etc.
• the opposing party - who defends the law under scrutiny - is a government agency or the parliament;
• citizens or organizations can intervene in favor of the law;
• the decision of Tribunal is not formally binding on anyone, it does not formally remove the law from the system;
• decisions of the Tribunal have credibility and political clout, because of (1) openness and high public visibility of the proceedings, (2) quality of analysis, (3) involvement of prominent figures who sit on the panel;
• Justices of the Tribunal: selected members of the Supreme Court, selected members of the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman, members of the government, leaders of opposition parties in Parliament, leaders of prominent NGOs and business organizations;
• the Tribunal can appoint and hear its own experts on law, economy, social or natural sciences;
• the Tribunal holds public hearings, web-casted live; jurisprudence of the Tribunal, all the briefs, expert opinions, transcripts of hearings, are published and searchable on the web.

• give voice to social or economic interests which are affected by quality of law;
• be open as to standing for citizens and organizations, even if there is no “legal” interest involved;
• allow for structured discussion;
• produce clear cut conclusions;
• warrant credibility of findings as to the subject matter;
• focus mainstream public interest around the results.

From Tahrir Square to Capitol Hill, reform activists, businesspeople, investors and average citizens alike are grappling with a common issue: good governance. How can each nation secure government that is honest and not corrupt, serves the public interest and not the special interests, and eschews damaging sectarian and ideological battles to deliver practical solutions to pressing problems? How can NGOs, businesses, investors, and the media support building this capacity, including through better governance of their own institutions? What is the interrelationship between economic freedom/prosperity and good governance, and are the former possible without the latter?